CREST Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

Understanding Interactions between Conspiracy Communities and Far Right Groups on Telegram and the Role of Figureheads

FULL REPORT

JULY 2024

MICE[2]

JULY 2024

Understanding Interactions between Conspiracy Communities and Far Right Groups on Telegram and the Role of Figureheads

FULL REPORT

MICE^2

This report was produced as part of the 'MICE^2' project, which develops an empirically informed, conceptual model of the interactive influences between contemporary forms of political extremism and conspiracy theories. You can find all the outputs from this project at: *www.crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/mapping-influence-between-conspiracy-communities-and-extremist-entities/*

Study design, data analysis and findings were completed independently by the research team and should not be taken as representative of views held by those who fund CREST.

ABOUT CREST

The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) is funded by the UK's Home Office and security and intelligence agencies to identify and produce social science that enhances their understanding of security threats and capacity to counter them. Its funding is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC Award ES/V002775/1).

www.crestresearch.ac.uk

©2024 CREST Creative Commons 4.0 BY-NC-SA licence. **www.crestresearch.ac.uk/copyright**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4

INTRODUCTION 6

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 8

- Social Network Analysis and Identification 9
- Hone Extracted Sample and Coding 9
- Investigative Netnography 9
- Frame Analysis 9
- Text Analytics 9

INTERACTION CASE STUDY 10

- Introduction 10
- Data 10
- Method Adaptation and Findings: Interaction Case Study 12
- Sample Coding 14
- Frame Analysis 18
- Netnographic Deep Dive 29
- Summary Interaction Case Study 30

FIGUREHEAD CASE STUDY 31

- Introduction 31
- Data 31
- Findings: Figurehead Case study 33
- Summary Figurehead Case Study 40

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 41

- Future Research 42

APPENDIX 43

BIBLIOGRAPHY 45

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Eruptions of violence during the coronavirus pandemic and the events of January 6th, 2021, exemplified the need to understand how conspiracy theories and far right ideology interact to create security threats. Social media presents as a key player in enabling the exchange between political messages and conspiracy theories, and this project sought to seek to understand the intra-actions and interactions between conspiracy communities and political groups.

To achieve this, we synthesise techniques from computer science and social science to analyse data from Telegram to consider groups on the far right of mainstream political parties and their interactions with conspiracy communities.

The first case study examines how groups relate to other groups whilst the second case study inspects the role of figureheads and group dynamics in conspiracy groups and far right groups (including those not considered extreme).

INTERACTION CASE STUDY:
Interactions between far right and conspiracy groups on Telegram during pandemic

Network analysis shows the importance of Tommy Robinson as a key figure in connecting conspiracy and far right groups using 'bridging concepts' (ideas that resonate in both group frames). It also reveals that interaction is predominantly unidirectional in that conspiracy channels forward far right content, but it is not reciprocated. The inspirational frame: freedom and bridging frame: child protection fostered interaction between the two group types and motivated active behaviour.

KEY FINDINGS:

- Interactions between conspiracy and far right groups are organised around three key master frames, which fulfil three key roles:

1. **Isolator frame:** Hidden truth – This frame remained salient throughout the time period studied and in previous studies (please see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) however it was most influential in intra-actions than interactions as it served to isolate adherents from the broader mainstream.

2. **Bridging frame**: Child protection – provided a united sense of purpose across disparate groups especially in the pandemic.

3. **Inspirational frame:** Freedom – motivated a radical response to rights being eroded and was particularly potent in the context of coronavirus restrictions.

- Figureheads and group dynamics played an important role in fostering interactions between groups and influencing intra-actions within groups.

FIGUREHEADS CASE STUDY: Figurehead and group dynamic in conspiracy and far right groups

We identified accounts which had direct figurehead-led and follower-led equivalents. Generally, the far-right group structure tended to be more top-down and this was reflected in the larger number of channels compared to conspiracy accounts. The introduction of new topics and forwarding conspiracy groups' content tended to be done first by the figurehead equivalent. Conspiracy groups, on the other hand, tended to take a grassroots approach and fostered open discussion and group crossover events. New topics were often introduced by follower equivalents. This shows that both group types are vulnerable to manipulation either from idea injection at the top by figureheads or injection at the bottom by follower account users.

GLOSSARY

CONCEPTUAL TERMINOLOGY

- **Far Right** – an umbrella term used to refer to those to the ideological right of mainstream politics (see Lee, 2015). In this report, Far Right includes both those who are on the extreme right and those who do not meet that threshold yet remain on the 'radical right' of mainstream political beliefs.
- **Conspiracy Theory** – a belief that there are hidden mechanisms for events that are controlled by elites with a sinister goal(s) (Pigden, 2006).

PLATFORM SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY

- **Group (Telegram)** – A set of users in Telegram, normally interested in the same topic. All members can send and receive messages and can invite other members of the group or join via a link.
- **Channel (Telegram)** – Typically, these will have one or a few administrators who control the channel. Only administrators can publish messages in the channel. An unlimited number of people can subscribe to receive broadcast messages from the administrator(s).
- **Accounts** – Either a channel or group on telegram.
- **User(s)** – Individuals operating individual accounts.
- **Forwarding (Telegram)** – "An account can forward an original message (published by another account) to a different account; similar to email forwarding and the retweet action in X (formally Twitter). The content of a forwarded message and the original message are the same, but the forwarded message includes the name and profile link of the original content provider" (Dargahi Nobari et al., 2017:2036).
- **Mentioning (Telegram)** – "Accounts in Telegram have a unique username which can be used as a reference to mention an account." (Dargahi Nobari et al., 2017:2036).

INTRODUCTION

This study will examine a broader range of groups including those with conspiracy beliefs and those positioned to the right of mainstream politics, but which may not meet the threshold for extremism. The primary focus is the interactions between different groups and how these are stimulated and inhibited by mutually animating concepts, group structure and figurehead. It also seeks to generate insights into under what circumstances conspiracy and far-right groups, either singly or together, engage in offline harms.

The coronavirus pandemic and rise of populist conspiracy theories have demonstrated a rise in violence in the United Kingdom. Examples of this include violence at lockdown protests, the terror attack on Dover migrant centre "driven by a right-wing ideology" (BBC, 2022), and attacks against public infrastructure such as 5G towers (BBC, 2020). As a result, it is of paramount importance that the relationships, assimilation and coordination of conspiracy and far right groups be understood.

The definition of conspiracy theories employed in this research is, "a secret plan on the part of some group to influence events by partly covert action" (Pigden, 2006:157). This definition can encompass a broader diversity of beliefs, such as true or yet unproven conspiracy theories which are often excluded by more severe definitions. While our earlier report (*Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) focused on the interplay between extremism and conspiracy theories, this report adopts a broader approach.

Although the terms "far right" and "extreme right" are frequently used interchangeably, they are differentiated in their approach to democratic norms whilst the far right may sit on the right of mainstream politics the extreme right reject democracy and social order (Lee, 2017; Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018; Lee, 2019). Ravndal and Bjørgo (2018:6) propose a characterization of the far right as rooted in "the acceptance of social inequality, authoritarianism, and nativism" which is also true for the extreme right. In our research, the term "far right" serves as an umbrella concept encompassing individuals and groups situated to the right of mainstream political ideologies. This encompasses both radicals, who employ democratic means to pursue their objectives, and extremists, who operate beyond the bounds of democratic norms.

However, it is an important distinction that not all far right groups necessarily meet the threshold to be considered extreme. The interaction case study and following figurehead case study, widens the spectrum of interactions to not just extremist groups but also "far right" actors and their interactions with conspiracy groups.

This report focuses on the broader spectrum of the far right to provide a more holistic view of not only how conspiracy theories interact with movements that are already extreme, but whether they may have an escalating effect on groups which have not yet reached the threshold for extremism. This expansion provides an additional dimension for comparison, enabling the scrutiny of how dynamics evolve when examining numerous groups exhibiting varying degrees of political beliefs.

The report follows two case studies designed to build upon each other and to understand what motivates action, including animating concepts, grievances, and the currency of conceptual bridging between the groups studied. They are:

1. **Interaction case study:** Interactions between different conspiracy and far-right groups on Telegram during UK Covid lockdowns and their engagement patterns. The current research include a large number of groups to understand how they operate and interact as part of a wider ecosystem. To examine these groups, SHIFT analysis (for a more in depth discussion of the techniques employed in SHIFT analysis and previous applications please see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) is used, which brings together data science and social research techniques within a broadly abductive approach. SHIFT analysis is adaptable to a large number of actors and groups.

2. **Figurehead case study:** The animating role of figureheads and group dynamics in conspiracy and far-right groups. This case study selects from the wider dataset direct equivalents of groups managed by a figurehead or less centralised follower-led groups to compare the group dynamics in conspiracy and far right circles. This allows for closer inspection of differences in group behaviour and findings from the interaction case study.

The interaction case study will examine the interaction between several conspiracy and far right groups on the Telegram platform and how they influenced one another in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. The figurehead case study takes a deeper dive into this data to examine the role of figureheads and group dynamics in conspiracy and far right movements. Finally, this report will summarise its findings and discuss the implications for policy and future research.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The research objectives in this report are as follows:

1. **Understand interactions and influence between conspiracy and far right groups.**

    a. The interaction case study looks specifically at the interactions between different types of groups; "conspiracy" vs. "far right" groups.

    b. The figurehead case study examines how figureheads and group structure play a role in these interactions.

2. **To understand how SHIFT analysis can be used to analyse distinct conspiracy theories and far-right groups on social media.**

    a. The interaction case study employs the same method in a different context, over a longer time period and with a greater number of groups.

3. **Examine the intra-actions and group dynamics in groups that exchange conspiracy theories and/or far right ideas.**

    a. The figurehead case study looks at the figurehead and group structure of both conspiracy and far right groups and thus can provide insight into the impact of internal group dynamics.

Social media has allowed groups with distinct ideologies to proliferate and connect with one another. This has enabled bridging, growth and coordination of different groups and facilitated interaction. However social media echo chambers can also polarise views and lead to greater division. Social media is widely used by conspiracy groups and far right entities. Both social science and computer science are needed to analyse interactions on social media. SHIFT analysis describes a method which integrates techniques from both fields to be able to interpret data of this nature. The following techniques in SHIFT analysis are outlined below.

For further detail on the SHIFT analysis techniques and methodology please see the *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism* report.



SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION

This aims to identify the most relevant users and posts as social media allows for unprecedented levels of data to be collected at pace. This technique also allows insights into how identified groups interact with each other and behave in their ecosystem. Complex network analysis can be used to understand these interactions using forwarding behaviour on Telegram.

HONE EXTRACTED SAMPLE AND CODING

Extracting a highly relevant sample and honing the salient themes enables researchers to codify the dataset and sort it into significant categories.

INVESTIGATIVE NETNOGRAPHY

A deep dive into the most influential portion of the data and implementation of netnographic techniques grants closer scrutiny of pivotal moments.

FRAME ANALYSIS

Frame analysis is a technique used in social science to understand the social frameworks which impact perceptions and behaviour (Goffman, 1974). This can be employed to understand the master frames present in the dataset which are driving discussion and promoting interaction (Porter & Hellsten, 2014).

TEXT ANALYTICS

Text analytics employs computer science techniques to expand the findings from previous techniques to apply them to the wider data set. This enables both contextual richness and the robustness of replicating findings over a more extensive dataset

INTERACTION CASE STUDY: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONSPIRACY AND FAR RIGHT GROUPS ON TELEGRAM

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen a rise in violent acts associated with the far-right including attacks on migrant centres and violent clashes at protests and counter protests (James, 2022). In parallel there has been a surge in violence from conspiracy movements during the coronavirus pandemic including vandalism against infrastructure and increased risks to public health, such as not following government advice designed to stop the spread of infections (BBC, 2020). This case study examines a breadth of diverse conspiracy and far-right groups to deepen understanding of how these groups interact and influence one another.

To build on the findings from the previous case study, we sought to, first, demonstrate how SHIFT analysis could be adapted to different contexts and cover not just a single group but multiple groups over a longer period. Secondly, to examine whether the frames identified in QAnon - January 6th (see *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism report*), were generalizable to other contexts or whether other issues became more salient.

Thirdly, while our previous research focused on intra-actions of one singular group which had features of both conspiracy and extremism (QAnon), this interaction case study focuses instead on a wider range of groups and looked at the interaction between those groups to understand how they might influence each other. Specifically, we examined individuals and groups that espoused conspiracy theories as well as individuals and groups which propagated far-right beliefs and ideologies.

In the interaction case study, we adopt the term 'far right' as the collection criteria to offer a wider expanse of the range of interactions with conspiracy individuals and groups. Entities were classified as 'far right' based on their previous classification as such by media, NGOs or government (for full details please see Appendix 3).

DATA

Case studies explore data collected from the social media platform Telegram. Telegram is a messaging platform which allows for two types of accounts: groups and channels.

> **Groups: A group in Telegram consists of a set of users who are interested in the same topic. All members of a group can send and receive messages in the group. Users can be invited by another member of the group, or they can join it by a unique join link provided by the group administrators.**
>
> **Channels: Channels are a feature to broadcast public messages to a large number of users. A channel usually has one or just a few administrators who are the only one(s) who can publish messages in the channel. An unlimited number of users can subscribe to each channel-by-channel username or its join link." (Dargahi Nobari et al. 2017).**

Groups tend to promote discussion and interaction between their members. Channels are generally more one-way and appropriate for broadcasting content from one user to their subscribers. The below example illustrates how the different types of account appear on telegram.



Example 1. Channel



Example 2. Group

Telegram was selected for this case study as, like Parler, the lack of content moderation means that it is a platform where conspiracy and far right users can speak freely without guarding their behaviour. Furthermore, as this case study was largely retrospective, telegram messages were less likely to have been removed for violating guidelines. Despite this, it is important to note that some messages may have been removed by moderators and that the data examined here may represent a less extreme subset of the messages posted.

75 accounts were identified by the researchers by looking for channels and groups which had been identified in the media as either conspiracy or far right (please see Appendix 3 for media references). Identification through the media was selected as a sampling method as it allowed the dataset to identify those entities which were the most sensational and influential. This sample was snowballed to further include other entities mentioned in the description or pinned messages of accounts identified through the media. The message history of these channels and groups was collected resulting in 3,943,522 messages ranging from 2018 to 2022. It should be noted that although this research classifies groups as either conspiracy or far right in reality the groups represent a diverse mix of those which might only be categorised as far right, only conspiracy or both. This research has attempted to classify them into either category for the purposes of comparison however in the figurehead case study we will discuss how the blurring between the categories also impacts the group dynamics observed.

Despite having a similar number of conspiracy and far right accounts in the sample (40 and 35, respectively), conspiracy channels and groups accounted for almost three times the number of messages as far right channels and groups (see Table 3). This highlighted that there are key differences in the way in which conspiracy and far right groups are structured and communicate. Conspiracy channels and groups send almost 3 times as many messages than far right channels and groups. Furthermore, the data revealed that conspiracy channels and groups were almost ten times as likely to forward messages compared to far-right channels and groups. Another key difference in the communication style was that conspiracy channels and groups were more than 150 times more likely to forward messages

from far-right channels and groups than vice versa. Although marginally more conspiracy groups were collected than far right this was not seen as an issue for analysis as both datasets are still substantial.Whilst the forwarded messages from other type account for a small proportion of the total messages it gives a clear insight into moments of clear direct influence between groups. Furthermore, as this research uses forwarding behaviour as a clear indicator of direct interaction between groups it also examines the content of non-forwarded messages to examine whether there may be indirect exchange of ideas between groups.

	CONSPIRACY	FAR RIGHT
Channels and Groups	40	35
Total Messages	2,959,022	984,500
Original Messages	2,206,674	907,642
Forwarded Messages	752,348	76,858
Replies (Original or Forwarded)	1,457,411	715,782
Forwarded messages from other type (e.g., far right messages forwarded by conspiracy accounts or vice versa).	26,343	165

Table 1. Data Summary Interaction case study

METHOD ADAPTATION AND FINDINGS: INTERACTION CASE STUDY

NETWORK ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION

A network analysis was conducted on the 75 accounts to understand the connections between them. This was done using forwarded messages between different accounts. "Forwarding" is when an account sends a copy of a message to a different group or channel, similar to the "retweet" functionality available on X (formerly Twitter).

Figure 1 . shows far right accounts in purple and conspiracy accounts in orange. The initial forward network shows that the accounts primarily forward content within their respective category (e.g., conspiracy to conspiracy or far right to far right).

The Forward Graph in Figure 2. is limited to instances where one category has forwarded content from the other category. It shows that overwhelmingly the conspiracy accounts forward content from far-right accounts whereas the inverse (far right accounts forwarding content from conspiracy accounts) is comparatively rare. It also shows the account Tommy Robinson News is the most forwarded account by conspiracy groups as indicated by its centrality in the network and the thickness of the lines. Figure 3. shows the daily message volume for the two types of channels and groups (orange = conspiracy, purple = far right) over time. The left-hand figure shows data for all accounts, while the right-hand figure shows data with Tommy Robinson removed. The figure on the right-hand side shows this excluding the channel "Tommy Robinson's Official Telegram Chat", which shows that this particular group is responsible for a large volume of posts from the far right in our dataset.



Figure 1. Forward network graph of 75 conspiracy and far right accounts.



Figure 2. Forward graph showing forwards from one type of account (conspiracy or far right) to the other type (e.g., conspiracy forwarding far right content or far right groups forwarding content from conspiracy groups).

As can be seen, the majority of messages were sent in the latter half of 2021 by conspiracy groups. This may be accounted for by the large amount of coronavirus related content that was focused on anti-vaccination narratives (rather than lockdown restrictions). Anti-vaccination topics were more prevalent in the messages, when compared to other conspiracy theories surrounding covid, as these communities existed prior to covid and thus benefit from pre-established groups. This contrasts with anti-lockdown groups, which were establish during covid and were more likely to be removed by moderators.



Figure 3. shows the volume of posts over time for conspiracy and far right telegram accounts for all posts (left-hand side), and for posts when Tommy Robinson's Official Telegram Chat is removed (right-hand side).

SAMPLE CODING

To streamline the data for the sample coding, we extracted the first instance that an account of one type (conspiracy or far right) forwarded content from an account of another type. To help understand context of these messages and why these messages were chosen over others for forwarding, the hour preceding and following this first instance was extracted. This allows focus on the concepts that created bridges between conspiracy and far right communities and allowed them to influence one another. Only posts with over 10 words were extracted, creating a dataset with 5,445 posts which were each manually and qualitatively analysed.

The results revealed several themes that operate as a shared currency for frame bridging:

- **Coronavirus conspiracies** – These included references to 5G causing coronavirus symptoms, anti-vaccination conspiracy theories and misinformation, denial of coronavirus pandemic or the severity of the pandemic and belief that coronavirus was designed by elite groups to achieve some sinister purpose.
- **Conspiracy references** – As well as coronavirus specific conspiracies, posts were also coded for whether they mentioned other or more general conspiracy theory references. This included

climate denial, QAnon conspiracies, antisemitic conspiracies.

- **Far right references** – This included specific references to far-right groups, individuals, or ideology, such as mentioning far right figures or using specific phrases and rhetoric.
- **Escalating language** – This assessed whether the language was designed to escalate toward or legitimise violence including advocations for physical violence or traitor speech.
- **Religious references** – This was used to gauge the impact of religion and spirituality in conspiracy and far right groups as this was shown to be an important factor in previous research (see: Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism)
- **Far right talking points** – This theme included more topics relevant to the far right but not specific far right references and for example: included talking points such as references to patriotism and maintaining control over immigration.

Figure 4 shows the percentage of posts that adhered to the above themes across both groups. Around a quarter of all posts involved some form of conspiracy content and just under 15% of posts referenced covid conspiracies specifically. The high level of conspiracy content exemplifies how conspiracy is used as a vehicle to promote discussion. Approximately 2% of posts were classed as involving specific far right references, which is relatively low proportion of the total messages.

Therefore, it can be concluded that far right rhetoric in isolation is not particularly popular in conspiracy communities. This is most likely due to the majority of messages being forwarded by conspiracy channels or groups. Thus, themes which are present in far-right channels and groups but resonate with conspiracy communities would be expected to be the most popular. What is unclear is whether one or both groups deliberately adopted a theme to enable interactions with those outside their group. The themes which enable interaction with outsiders will be explored in further depth in the frame analysis section. Whilst it is possible that the membership of these two groups overlaps it is still of interest that whilst conspiracy groups forward content from far right accounts this content is still predominantly related to conspiracy theories.

Three percent of content contained escalating language, which is much lower than the 15% we observed for QAnon in previous research (see *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism* report). This difference may relate to the context of the messages (storming of the capitol in January 2021 compared to lockdown protests and other sporadic flashpoints in these posts that give rise to more scattered and subdued outbursts). Close to five percent (4.7%) of posts contained religious and spiritual references indicating that, unlike QAnon (where religion was mentioned in 8% of posts), religion does not play as great a role in these movements. Far right talking points were a marginally greater topic of discussion (2.2%) compared to specific far right rhetoric (1.6%).



Figure 4. Sample Coding Results for Both Conspiracy and Far Right Channels and Groups

Using the sample coded data we were able to shed light on the narrative overlap between conspiracy and far right groups (see Figure 5). As might be expected, far right accounts were much more likely to discuss patriotic content and use far right references. Interestingly, conspiracy accounts were more likely to use escalating and religious language. Conspiracy discussion was higher in conspiracy groups; however, it was the dominant theme in both accounts underlining its important role as a vehicle for generating intergroup discussion. The narrative overlap of the groups helps to estimate to what extent some individuals who subscribe to channels or groups of one category (conspiracy or far right) may also subscribe to the other. More simply, are members of "conspiracy" groups and channels also classified as far right. Figure 5. shows that 1.4% of content on conspiracy accounts included far right rhetoric. Of the conspiracy accounts that forwarded messages from far-right accounts, 50% of this content contained specific far right rhetoric. Examining it from the perspective of the far right accounts in the dataset, 9.6% of content from far-right accounts contained conspiracy theory references. Of the far-right accounts that forwarded messages from conspiracy accounts, 71% of channels had forwarded content that contained specific conspiracy theory references. Thus, whilst the bulk of direct influence (that is, directly forwarding content) is from far-right groups to conspiracy groups. Conspiracy content is more widely discussed on both types of group.

	CONSPIRACY	FAR RIGHT
Total	40	35
Forwarded other type (conspiracy accounts forwarding far right messages or vice versa).	32	14
Forwarded specific content	16	10

Table 2. Number of channels/groups engaging in specific behaviours.



Figure 5. Content analysis conspiracy accounts and far right accounts.

The sample coding allowed us to compare the forwarded vs. non forwarded messages and thereby identify the issues that help to bridge the two communities and provide opportunities to influence each other. Figure 6 shows that forwarded messages contained a marginally higher level of covid conspiracy content. Forwarded messages were much more likely to have far right references and references to far right talking points exemplifying that the far right accounts in our dataset were shaping the conversation. Religious references were forwarded less, showing that although religiosity plays a role in the movement, it does not act as a bridge between the two groups. Similarly, escalating language was less likely to be forwarded showing it may not be the bridge between communities but may instead happen in response to forwarded messages.



Figure 6. Content analysis forwarded and not forwarded messages.

FRAME ANALYSIS

Frame analysis aimed to generate master frames, which were the driving force motivating behaviour in this case the behaviour that is most of interest is interaction between outside groups. This was done using posts which had been identified as containing indicators for behaviour. Porter & Hellsten (2014) use social media data to infer master frames. They endeavour to identify the master frames in the dataset and dissect the component framing tasks. The framing tasks include:

1. **Diagnostic Framing** - ascertains the grievance of the frame which involves isolating what aspect of life needs to be protected and assigns blame to perceived threats (Kavrakis, 2022).

2. **Prognostic Framing** – proposes solutions to address the grievance identified by diagnostic framing (ibid)

3. **Motivational Framing** – aims to call to action and justify their approach (ibid)

For example, these would be posts which took a more personal tone and discussed their core beliefs or worldviews:

> **"I see a lot of people are beginning get fearful now and are losing faith so I thought I better put some of those minds at ease. 5 years ago you had a military intelligence group of insiders come to you, the people through a backchannel in the depths of the internet to warn you about what was coming. In that time, they have taught you how to read current events as they play out and to see the coded communications that are put out to help people piece together things as they progress. The media was never going**

> **to do it for us. The choice to know was always yours.**
>
> **…**
>
> **I know it's not easy but you must trust yourselves and trust that everything is going to be alright. Because it is! Have faith, and stay strong! We will prevail.**

We found three primary master frames present in both conspiracy and far right channels and groups: hidden truth, freedom, and child protection. The subsequent section will cover these frames in more detail and the text analytics will demonstrate the key words and phrases in each frame. Each master frame was analogous to a diagnosis, prognosis, and collective action position: social polarisation and radical action. Table 3 summarises these positions.

Master Frame	Grievance and Diagnostic		Prognostic	Motivational
	Protecting	Threat		
Epistemic Frame: Hidden Truth	The truth	Media	Prophecy of truth	Social polarisation
Existential Frame: Freedom	Rights and freedoms	Government	Regain control	Radical action
Social Frame: Child Protection	Children	Elites or social out-groups	Identify threats	Retaliation

Table 3. Interaction Case Study Master Frame Summary

Posts were coded for the three frames identified. These frames act as hooks or animating issues upon which conspiracy and far right groups can promote interaction. Interestingly, all three frames were referenced in approximately 5% of the posts.

HIDDEN TRUTH

The first dominant master frame identified was consistent with previous research into frames salient to the QAnon movement in the lead up to January 6th (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*). There was a sense that users felt that the truth was being hidden from them and generally this was seen as the agenda of the mainstream media. This helped to drive the movement as it encouraged the spreading of the 'truth' and enlightening further people.

> **"I don't believe that one bit and I don't believe anyone in here does. In fact, I believe it's just the opposite. The more corruption that is exposed the larger this movement grows".**

This was often in the context of covid-based conspiracies. The 'truth' was positioned in opposition to the mainstream media and typically encouraged either trying to convince others of the truth or cut them off from those who did not believe. Thus, it acts as a group separator and polarising mechanism.

> **"WHY CAN'T ANY ONE IN MY FAMILY OR FRIENDS I KNOW BELIEVE A WORD ILL F*CKIN TELL THEM....I try and tell them it is distraction News from BS MSM and propaganda".**

The prognostic framing in this master frame aims to prophesize the 'truth' and uses rumours and opinions to assert their opinion.

> **"I'm trying to wake up those who are willing to open their eyes. we chose to stand alone and say no, to be the only one in one hundred people in a store to not wear a mask, ridicule, and shaming... We are the lions, they are the sheep".**

This case study demonstrated a much higher extent of individuals encouraging one another to not only disengage from the mainstream media but also their families who were not engaging in conspiracy theories. Much like previous research into the QAnon movement (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) this theme serves as an isolator function from mainstream views although it is interesting to note that in this context a greater emphasis was placed on spreading the message to others, compared to intra-actions within QAnon.

FREEDOM

The second dominant master frame was the idea that freedoms and rights were being eroded. This can be seen in the numerous protests and rallies which referenced 'freedom' in their titles such as the 'unite for freedom' march which will be discussed in greater detail in the netnographic analysis (Metro, 2020). This underlines the importance of a sense of freedom in these movements and the coronavirus restrictions as a barrier to their freedoms as a uniting issue between conspiracy and far right groups. The script for this frame often involved invoking ideas of the way that 'life used to be', and a tyrannical government. The diagnosis of this frame centres around protecting their 'sacred rights' and the script often references the infringement of rights and the need to stand up to protect them. This frame acts as an inspirational function.

> **"Praying for strength for all of us to fight the insane mandates. Stand up for freedom!"**

Their positioning in opposition to a 'tyrannical government' often went hand in hand with the hidden truth frame. Typical arguments involved variations of the corrupt government lying to legitimise their agenda. The framing of the government as 'tyrannical' serves as an enabling function.

> **"The government has deliberately falsified the death total in order to sell a tyrannical lockdown to the public".**

The motivational framing task and collective action position in this frame were to regain control. Generally, posts adopting this collective action position aimed to call others to arms or to stand up for their freedoms. They advocate to break away from following the rules and followed a revolutionary spirit.

> **"There are more of us than them. They need to be put back in their place and face their fears now. The only way to stop this is to stop complying".**

CHILD PROTECTION

The final dominant master frame argues that children need protecting from sinister forces who wish to sexually abuse them or use unsafe vaccines on them. This frame clearly centres around the innocence of children as a unifying and animating issue as it is difficult to argue against the idea that children should be protected from evil.

> **"We all unite to defend the innocence of the children🙏"**

The threat of sexual or medical abuse that this grievance draws upon, presents slightly differently in conspiracy and far-right groups. In the far right accounts studied, the sexual abuse threat is seen mostly to come from social out-groups such as migrants and religious / ethnic minorities in 'grooming gangs'. The script for this presentation of the frame is often coloured by racial language and prejudice. For conspiracy groups, the sexual abuse is often seen to be perpetrated by elites or celebrities – fitting more closely with the QAnon understanding of child satanic ritual abuse. However, both groups converge over the idea to protect children from the dangers of sexual abuse and vaccines, creating a bridging function.

> **"LITTLE WHITE GIRLS ARE THEN RAPED BY THESE MIGRANT CHILD RAPISTS"**

> **"They will eventually put the death shot in with the childhood vaccines. Pure evil"**

The prognosis for this frame aims to identify and confront those inflicting the supposed abuse. These claims justify radical action to be taken against the perpetrators and can be powerfully motivational because of the universal understanding that children should be protected at all costs. The motivational framing necessitates radical retaliation against those perceived to be harming children.

> **"But I was told I was a conspiracy theorist for telling people about elite paedophiles in Hollywood?"**



Figure 7. Percentage of all messages containing three frames (trust, freedom, child protection)

Figure 8. shows the percentage of content for each frame in conspiracy and far right groups when considered separately. Although conspiracy and far right accounts tended to engage similarly with the freedom frame, conspiracy accounts tended to be more preoccupied with the truth frame than far right accounts and far right accounts were more concerned with child protection.



Figure 8. Percentage of conspiracy and far right messages containing three frames (trust, freedom, child protection)

Figure 9. shows that issues of child protection and freedom were more likely to be forwarded and provide bridges between conspiracy and far right communities whereas 'hidden truth' was not. Furthermore, hidden truth remained more of a concern of conspiracy communities.



Figure 9. Frame analysis coding forwarded and not forwarded messages.

In our analysis for QAnon, (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) we found that religious references, rumours, psychological vulnerability were used to spread the content of the QAnon movement. Thus, these techniques were also examined in this context.

Religious references – There were significantly fewer religious references in the current data when compared to a QAnon sample. However, religion was often used as a way of adding a lighter side to the movement or provide hope. In the QAnon movement religious references, as well as offering an optimistic future but it was also utilised to reinforce a hierarchical structure and provide a motivation for action by referring to a higher purpose.

> **"I'm putting down my fear. And picking up my faith ♡"**

Role of rumours – Rumours and prophecies, as in previous research into QAnon (ibid), were often used as a currency and traded to show status and animate discussion within conspiracy and far right groups. They also served the function of providing an answer to the hidden truth frame.

> **"Dr. Mercola Exposes the Great Reset; Vaccine Passports Coming? New-borns Separated from Covid Moms".**

Psychological vulnerability – As with previous research into QAnon (ibid), there were often indicators of psychological vulnerability. Although this must be caveated by noting that psychological conditions cannot be diagnosed by analysis of social media posts. However, there are certain posts which clearly indicate that users are experiencing social isolation especially considering the covid pandemic where people were encouraged to not see loved ones and differing opinions regarding coronavirus restrictions may have led to further estrangement.

> **"It is the wrong side, the evil side. FFS! I absolutely despise the human race. Most of my own family who feel entitled to impose their fear and their cancellation of life on the rest of society."**

Conceptual Piggybacking – A new technique that was identified in this case study was that conspiracies were often compounded. Users often attempted to engage with one issue and then add another conspiracy in an attempt to garner support. This may allow adherents to test out their ideas.

> **"It is clear that Covid has always been to further the climate change agenda, population and resources control".**

TEXT ANALYTICS

The text analytics involved several different steps including identifying the top phrases used by the conspiracy and far right groups, generating word clouds for the identified themes and frames and emotion detection over time.

Analysis of the top 20 key phrases shows the presence of three major themes:

1. Anti-establishment – particularly phrases which indicate distrust of the government and mainstream media

   Examples: Mainstream media, mentions of British politicians, Social Media

2. Opposition to coronavirus restrictions

   Examples: Covid passports, covid tyranny, chyna virus, coronavirus tyranny, Big Pharma, Face mask, experimental covid jab, covid jab

3. References to immigration, great replacement, and white genocide conspiracy theories

   Examples: Illegal immigrants, white anglosphere west, white people, Kalergis vision

Emotion detection is a natural language processing technique that aims to classify the emotion of text. This technique was applied to conspiracy and far right accounts over time to identify any changes (see Figure 10 for results). Although there is continuous fluctuation there is a general consistency between 60% and 40% for anger and joy. Whilst fear and sadness remain between 10 and 20%. Love and sadness are the least frequent emotions between 0 and 10%. One notable change in these trends is from around February 2022 where joy falls towards its lower bounds and anger rises towards its upper bounds and this returns to the general pattern after a few months. At this point fear and sadness also stabilise from fluctuating rapidly to being more consistent and from fear generally being below sadness to vice versa. One reason for this could be the impact of the "Tommy Robinson's Official Telegram Chat" and (which as shown in Figure 3. Produces a large amount of activity compared to the other accounts in this dataset) becomes active in February 2022. Another possibility could be that this coincides with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.



Figure 10. Emotion detection over time for far-right channels and groups.

To corroborate and assure the quality of the sample coding, word clouds were generated using a TF*IDF measure which measures word originality frequency and demonstrates word relevance.

For the coronavirus conspiracy content, the words are typically associated with covid and vaccines. Jab and shot tended to be used in a more derogatory way, whilst the use of vaccine generally indicated that the post was arguing from a more scientific or pseudo-scientific standpoint. As the entities studied in this case study were most active in 2021, the majority of messages were centred around anti-vaccination beliefs rather than denying coronavirus. As can be seen from the general conspiracy word cloud, coronavirus is central in the general conspiracy content however when coronavirus conspiracy terms are removed from the cloud, the remaining terms are more nebulous, general, and concerned with a 'global cabal' and climate change.



Figure 11. COVID conspiracies word cloud

Figure 12. Conspiracy content word cloud



Figure 13. Conspiracy content excluding covid-related conspiracies word cloud.

The far-right references word cloud clearly indicates, as with other elements of analysis, that Tommy Robinson is perceived as a pivotal symbolic figurehead within the far right accounts studied. It also included several racial slurs. The religious references were similar to previous research into QAnon (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) and represented an overwhelmingly Christian religious affiliation. There were repeated mentions to God, Satan, Jesus, and other religious figures. The escalation coded posts were very similar to those in previous research into QAnon (ibid) and were often centred around a call for others to stand up and fight with a noticeable use of traitor speech. The similarity of escalating language between this dataset and previous research into QAnon (ibid) suggests that escalating language could be identified on social media platforms regardless of the context. Finally, the far right talking point theme included lots of references to patriotic values as well as concern surrounding migrants.

Figure 14. Far Right References word cloud

Figure 15. Religious References word cloud

Figure 16. Escalating Language word cloud

Figure 17. Far right talking points word cloud 15. Religious References word cloud

Analysing the word clouds generated for the three master frames there is a clear presence of the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing tasks. In particular, it is clear to see what the frame values as important and who it views as the antagonist or threat to these values. The hidden truth frame is primarily concerned with the idea of truth and threat posed by mainstream media. Similarly with the freedom frame, several posts contain the word freedom and are often concerned with the figure of tyrants. For the child protection theme, several of the top terms include references to grooming and sexual abuse as well as references to the vaccine.

Figure 18. Hidden Truth Frame word cloud

Figure 19. Freedom Frame word cloud

Figure 20. Child Protection Frame word cloud

NETNOGRAPHIC DEEP DIVE

The final step of the analysis involved a deep dive into the Unite for Freedom protest in Trafalgar Square, London on the 29th of August 2020. This event was selected as it fitted the remit for providing a real-world action event, which correlated with a spike of activity in the dataset. The Unite for Freedom protest also presented an interesting event where several disparate groups from far right and conspiracy backgrounds appeared together in a conscious effort to unite into a larger protest collective (Metro, 2020). For the analysis, posts were collected that were posted within the three days preceding the event and the three days following the event. Isolating only posts which were over 10 words long this generated a dataset of 1,767 posts.

Unlike previous research into QAnon (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*), where analysis was focused on different voices around January 6th who were escalating or attempting to de-escalate, this case study is more focused on interaction between the different groups. Therefore, attention was on whether accounts were calling for unity or attempting to separate themselves from other groups.

Before the protest, some voices were attempting to organise and promote the idea that everyone is welcome and to spread their message further.

> **"Where do you live & which station or route will you take?"**

Others were seeking to differentiate themselves from others who they viewed as less committed or not understanding of their cause.

> **"Does anyone know how Saturday's demonstration at Trafalgar Square will be distinguished from the other groups demonstration."**

On the day of the event, whilst some were showing their belief in coming together as one cohesive movement, others were seeking to separate themselves from others and hoard resources for their own specific groups.

> **"Bless all the heroes and heroines standing up for the rights of the people, wherever they are! We're in short supply around these parts so I'll be there in spirit with you all".**

> **"I ask that these are not re-used anywhere else outside of this group."**

In the aftermath of the protest, some wanted to promote that the event welcomed a broad spectrum of groups and celebrate the unity, whilst others distanced themselves from what they saw as groups which didn't fit with their ethos. It is important to note that this bastion of individuals who refused to be merged with either conspiracy beliefs or the far right were not necessarily more extreme or dogmatic, and instead, in some cases represented a resistance to allowing their group to become associated with political views that they disagreed with.

> **"Just a small cross-section of people who attended the #London #UniteForFreedom #protest... All with valid questions, points of view and concerns about their rights and future"**

> **"As always extremists and agent provocateur appear at events but Saturday protest in London was awesome what some amazing people in the panel of speakers."**

SUMMARY INTERACTION CASE STUDY

This case study set out to understand whether the findings of previous research into QAnon (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) would also be salient in different contexts and with a larger number of groups. This case study also identified that whilst the hidden truth frame is still salient in this context other master frames, like standing up for threatened freedoms and protecting children become more important. The sample coding also highlights that whilst child protection and freedom frames were more present in messages which were forwarded across conspiracy and far right accounts, hidden truth did not bridge these communities and was more present in conspiracy messages. Building on this, this case study demonstrated how conspiracy and far right groups interact and the concepts which resonate with both groups. Furthermore, analysis has highlighted that the interaction is almost entirely unidirectional whereby conspiracy groups are promoting content from the far right accounts in our dataset rather than vice versa.

Although further investigation is needed to understand why this may be the case, the content analysis of the sample coding suggests that both conspiracy and far right rhetoric increase the likelihood of being shared between accounts. Whilst conspiracy content is used as a vehicle for discussion and was the most present theme, far right talking points and references are predominantly discussed by far-right accounts. Therefore, whilst forwarding is mainly done by conspiracy accounts parroting far right messages, the content of these messages is still primarily focused on conspiracy theories and far right rhetoric has not permeated these messages as deeply as might be expected. This case study has demonstrated that SHIFT analysis can be used in different contexts and with multiple groups to generate robust findings.

FIGUREHEAD CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF FIGUREHEADS IN CONSPIRACY AND FAR RIGHT GROUPS

INTRODUCTION

Previous research into QAnon (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) and the results of the interaction case study documented above, showed the perceived importance of single figures and their role in the group dynamics of conspiracy and far right movements.

In previous research, Trump emerged as symbolically crucial to the QAnon conspiracy theory (ibid), whilst in the interaction case study, accounts associated with Tommy Robinson emerged as a central node in the network of forwarding behaviour between accounts across our data sets of conspiracy and far right Telegram groups.

We sought to understand the role that figureheads and group structure plays in coordination between far right and conspiracy groups by examining whether the organisational structure of conspiracy and far right groups differs perceptibly. We also sought to understand to what extent figureheads influence their respective movements and whether frame bridging is driven more by followers or figureheads of movements.

DATA

The data used in this case study is largely similar to that of the interaction case study however this case study isolates groups and channels that have direct figurehead-led and follower-led equivalents. By using a similar dataset to the interaction case study, we seek to compare conspiracy and far right channels and groups at a more forensic level by equating figurehead-led channels and groups with follower-led channels and groups in order to identify similarities and differences.

To determine whether accounts were figurehead- or follower- led, they were assessed against several indicators to identify if there was a clear identifiable individual controlling the account, these indicators are summarised in Table 4.

Our aim here was to clearly identify which accounts were being controlled by singular individuals acting as figureheads and which were driven by follower discussion. The traits described in the following table shows how accounts were classified as figurehead-led or follower-led.

Trait	Figurehead-led indicator	Follower-led indicator
Account name	Associated figurehead name – figureheads must be a named single individual e.g., Mark Collett	Associated group name e.g., Patriotic Alternative
Bio and description of account.	Refers to associated figurehead e.g., "Independent Journalist, Nationalist Activist & Documentarian" (Vinnie Sullivan)	Refers to collective group e.g., "Independent Journalists Patriot Activists We Are Who We Are" (The Reality Report)
Account Type	Channels are controlled by a single account releasing content e.g., Great British Bird News	Groups are associated with several users and promoting discussion e.g., Great British Bird Social
Linguistic clues	Use of singular first person (e.g., "I have videos taken down for medical misinformation and hate speech all the time." Jayda Fransen	Use of plural first person and collective nouns. "Our main objective is to preserve the traditions, freedoms and very existence of the British people." British Freedom Party.

Table 4. Criteria for determining whether an account was a figurehead or follower led

Table 5. summarises the accounts that were assigned figurehead-led and follower-led.

Number	Account Type	Figurehead Account(s)	Follower-led Account(s)
1	**Far Right**	Tommy Robinson News	Tommy Robinson Official Chat
2	**Far Right**	Mark Collett Laura Towler	Patriotic Alternative
3	**Far Right**	Jayda Fransen	British Freedom Party Jayda Fransen Supporters
4	**Far Right**	Vinnie Sullivan Luke Uncaged Alexander Sangmoore	The Reality Report Street Soldier UK
5	**Conspiracy**	David Icke Official	David Icke
6	**Conspiracy**	Fiona Rose Diamond	FionaCoviLeaks
7	**Conspiracy**	Lee Garrett	Lee Garrett Chat
8	**Conspiracy**	Great British Bird	Great British Bird Main Chat

Table 5. Follower and Figurehead Equivalent Data Summary

FINDINGS: FIGUREHEAD CASE STUDY

The first section covers the group structure and the differences between conspiracy and far right groups. The second section looks at the concepts that provide bridging between the conspiracy and far right communities and whether it is figureheads or followers who are driving the introduction of these concepts and bridging these communities, or whether it follows a more grass roots approach where followers provide the initial impulse which is then picked up by figureheads when they see that it has gathered support.

GROUP STRUCTURE

The analysis showed a clear divide between conspiracy and far right communities in terms of how they are structured and operate. Far right accounts were much more likely to be channels rather than groups, whereas conspiracy accounts tended to be groups. As such, conspiracy groups fostered open discussion and the sharing of different theories whereas the far-right was predominantly characterised by a top-down structure of channels.



Figure 21. Account types of conspiracy and far right accounts used in the interaction case study.

Both far right and conspiracy accounts were majority follower-led, which speaks to the pyramidal structure of their group dynamics. Figure 22. shows the percentage of accounts studied in this analysis that can be characterised as figurehead-led and follower-led indicating that far right have a larger number of figurehead-led accounts in comparison to conspiracy accounts (using the selection criteria in Table 4.).

Thus, far right accounts were typically centred around or controlled by single users. Conspiracy accounts, in juxtaposition to this, were follower-led in the main, but showed a larger percentage of bottom-up structure. Indeed, cases from the conspiracy community that showed a top-down structure tended to be on the far-right end of the conspiracy accounts. (This recognises that although to demonstrate certain concepts we have segregated conspiracy and far right accounts, in reality, accounts exist in a Venn diagram where some accounts may have several ties to the far right but are predominantly focused on conspiracy content).



Figure 22. Figurehead-led or follower-led account types of conspiracy and far right accounts used in the interaction case study.

Figure 23. shows the forwarding activity of these 21 groups or channels (see Table 4.). Each connecting line represents a 'ribbon' with its thickness being proportional to the number of messages forwarded from the figurehead-led and follower-led accounts. This analysis shows the follower-led accounts either forward messages from several accounts or have a single focus.

For example, "Tommy Robinson's Official Telegram Chat" and "GreatBritishBird Main Group" (a conspiracy group noted for perpetuating child sexual abuse hoaxes [Montali, 2022]) are focused on forwarding content from their corresponding figurehead-led accounts, "Tommy Robinson News" and "Great British Bird".



Figure 23. Forwarding 'ribbon' graph of follower- and figurehead- led equivalent accounts.

"The Reality Report" is an example of a follower-led account forwarding messages from multiple accounts as highlighted in the figure below. It is acting as a transfer vessel for new ideas.



Figure 24. Forwarding 'ribbon' graph: The Reality Report

This suggests that follower-led accounts are set-up to serve as auxiliary accounts designed to forward content from the main account or serve a more general function, forwarding content from various sources. In the first case, the main account clearly holds a lot of influence over the auxiliary account and in the second, the accounts are influenced by a variety of sources.

FRAME BRIDGING

This section will examine the concepts and themes that allow the far right and conspiracy groups in our dataset to find common ground known as frame bridging. Also, the drivers of this frame bridging will be examined to establish whether it originates from figureheads or followers. Generally, the findings of this case study help to demonstrate that whilst far right tends to follow the influencer pattern whereby figureheads introduce their followers to new conspiracy accounts and concepts which then get picked up in the follower-led accounts. On the other hand, conspiracy accounts tended to favour groups which promote discussion and discourse and therefore, often far right accounts and concepts were introduced by the follower-led accounts and then repeated by the figurehead-led account if they were perceived to garner enough support. This section will also cover the moments of frame dissonance where either a figurehead or a follower attempts to stretch their frame too far and others reject this interpretation.

1. Tommy Robinson

The Tommy Robinson News and Tommy Robinson Official Chat exemplify the top-down relationship that typifies groups in the far right in our dataset. To illustrate this point, we can examine Tommy Robinson's recent statement on 'The Jewish Question' which referenced Kanye West's recent antisemitism and engaged antisemitic conspiracy theories. This represents a bridging concept where the far right and conspiracy communities might find common ground. Indeed, an extract from his statement exemplifies how Robinson uses this issue to attempt to appeal to conspiracy communities outside of the far right:

> **"Luckily, post CONVID, many more people are awake to these attack strategies used by ideologues, big tech, mainstream media, and politicians. In fact, I would argue that many people on the left have now found out for themselves what it is like to become a pariah, to become a social outcast, to be cancelled and un-personed, why? Because they dared to challenge the covid narrative they were being fed."**

By saying "many more people are awake" he uses the language of conspiracy theories ("awake", "CONVID") and directly references that his own audience is growing outside the far right and "on the left". The Tommy Robinson News account which was identified as figurehead-led promoted this statement on Robinson's own website. Whereas, by analysing the comments left on this channel and the Tommy Robinson Official Chat, there is a divide between some of his followers.

Some showed examples of frame dissonance…

> **"I don't entirely agree with ya, but we need these discussions."**

> **"If you are going to discuss a "Jewish Question" then why not also include CoE or Catholic questions seeing as the Christian Churches have had their institutions marched through and controlled just as much and possibly more so than Jewish ones?"**

But other followers called for Robinson to go further and encourage further international frame bridging…

> **"You gotta do more video, Tommy. You know your sh*t and I think people have a hunger for a bad ass Brit tellin it like it is. Especially Americans."**

This case helps to demonstrate how TRN can act to introduce his followers into harmful conspiracy beliefs from the top-down. Analysing the conspiracy accounts whose messages were forwarded by Tommy Robinson News (TRN - figurehead-led) and Tommy Robinson Official Chat (TROC - follower-led) shows that TRN forwarded three different conspiracy accounts whilst TROC only forwarded one conspiracy account minutes after it was initially forwarded by TRN. This demonstrates a high level of influence from TRN on TROC indicating that the push to bridge conspiracy and far right ideologies is coming from Tommy Robinson himself. TRN forwarded content that was anti-mainstream media and anti-government as well as pro-masculinity and coronavirus conspiracy content. However, the Tommy Robinson follower-led account only forwarded anti-government content.

2. Patriotic Alternative

The figureheads of the Patriotic Alternative movement (Mark Collett and Laura Towler) hosted and attended events several times with known conspiracy theorists such as David Clews. This co-presence at events and on Clews's show 'Unity News Network' (Searchlight,2023), demonstrates that while Clews often does not agree with Collett and Towler on their arguments about great replacement conspiracy theories (frame dissonance), Clews agrees over opposing coronavirus measures and platform censorship.

The Patriotic alternative page and comments reveal that whilst anti-vaccination content is relatively subdued compared to their individual pages, there is still a large amount of great replacement conspiracy theories.

Collett's account had forwarded messages from freedom-based protest conspiracy groups. However, these were not picked up by patriotic alternative or Laura Towler. This demonstrates a similar model to that seen in Tommy Robinson in that the frame bridging is being pioneered by the figurehead. However, the influence from figurehead to follower is less strong as in the Tommy Robinson case.

3. Jayda Fransen

Jayda Fransen and her supporters provide an exception to the general trend whereby far right groups tend to have a more top-down structure. Jayda Fransen's personal account posts less frequently about radical anti-vaccination content than the British Freedom Party, and when she does post about it on her personal account, most responses from her followers are calling for her to go further.

> **"It's an absolute joke, they are not even vaccines. They are trying to kill us as part of their Illuminati agenda."**

Whilst Jayda Fransen's personal page and the British Freedom Party had forwarded none of the conspiracy accounts' content, the supporters page forwarded content from Lee Garrett (an individual who represents the far-right end of the conspiracy account spectrum). The content forwarded from Lee Garrett was about social services removing children and fits the child protection frame, which has been shown to provide a bridge between the far right and conspiracy communities in our dataset.

4. The Reality Report

Vinnie Sullivan, Luke Uncaged and Alexander Sangmoore often engaged with conspiracy content and creators. In particular, they tended to forward Lee Garrett because of their personal ties with him and often also forwarded Mark Steele. This can be seen in the way that they discuss these figures.

Example 3. Image from Lee Garrett forwarded by Vinnie Sullivan showing their close friendship

> **"This is my Friend; The selfless, and admirable; Lee Garrett**
> **Whose Entire Life has been ripped apart for the sake of Defending Immorality.**
> **Those with Truth at their side are slandered the most."**

In terms of content, the figureheads are interested in a wide range of conspiracy narratives including those pre-dating the pandemic such as the illuminati. The reality report and UK street soldier channels mostly forward conspiracy style content from the 'figurehead' channels. There are a limited number of comments on these channels that are supportive of this type of content.

This group forwarded content from eight different conspiracy accounts. Although follower accounts had forwarded a wider variety of conspiracy content,

content forwarded by figureheads was more likely to be then forwarded by follower accounts than vice versa. The majority of follower-led conspiracy content was related to the child protection frame.

	Figurehead Accounts	Follower Accounts
Total Conspiracy Accounts Forwarded	5	7
Unique Accounts Forwarded	1	3
Accounts Forwarded First	3	1

Table 6. Forwarding Summary Reality Report

5. David Icke

The David Icke official telegram frequently references a variety of far right talking points such as immigration, freedom of speech, and antisemitic theories. However, it does not forward any far-right accounts in this dataset. In recent years, this has become less US focused and more UK focused. This can be seen both on their personal telegram account and on their website.

> **"Hundreds of Channel migrants have fled hotels and could be ANYWHERE".**

The follower-led account mostly forwards content from the official telegram or the website. The follower-led account has forwarded content from Tommy Robinson and Jack Dawkins that is generally anti-government sentiments and antisemitic tropes. The figurehead-led account had not forwarded any content from far-right accounts. This fits the conspiracy bottom-up model of interaction, where far right interactions are more popular in follower-led spaces than figurehead-led accounts.

6. Fiona Rose Diamond

Fiona Rose Diamond tends to only reference far right figures when they agree with her stance on covid restrictions. In comparison, the FionaCoviLeaks Chat (which is follower-led) has forwarded a wider variety of far-right figures including lots of Tommy Robinson content and far right themes (e.g., migration, pride in whiteness etc.). However, this discussion was not homogenous and several voices in the follower-led group were arguing against the frame bridging with far-right content and creators.

> **"The real threat is ***ts like --(far right figure)-- and --(other far right figure)-- claiming that anybody who blows the whistle on them is in bed with hope not hate".**

The follower-led chat had forwarded ten different far right accounts and although their primary focus was on coronavirus restrictions, far right accounts were also forwarded discussing immigration, anti-police, white pride, child abuse, Brexit, anti-media, anti-government and the Ukrainian conflict. The figurehead-led equivalent only forwarded content from Tommy Robinson after it was forwarded on the follower-led chat and this content was directly related to coronavirus restrictions. This exemplifies the conspiracy model of grass roots interactions filtering upwards to the figurehead.

7. Lee Garrett

Lee Garrett has ties with far-right figures such as Vinnie Sullivan and both his individual account and followers forward a wide array of far-right content. Some of the

followers call for Lee Garrett to engage further with the far right and a poll conducted on the follower-led account reveals 17% of Lee Garrett followers have turned away from Patriotic Alternative (PA), 42% still support PA, 8% are considering leaving PA and 33% are considering supporting PA. Therefore, the vast majority are either currently (or are considering) supporting PA. Furthermore, when followers do disagree with Lee Garrett over his engagement with the far right, for example:

> **"This "voice of Wales" are being propped up by the same group of Jews as Tommy Robinstein! Share this one guys as they're just more smug controlled opposition like Tommy."**

Lee Garrett represents the far-right end of the spectrum of conspiracy accounts. Despite being focused primarily on conspiracy content, Garrett is deeply entrenched with the far right accounts in our dataset and with several far-right figures. This is exemplified in the network analysis which places Garrett's account in the middle of the far right and conspiracy accounts we studied. Garrett's figurehead-led and follower-led equivalents follow more of a far right top-down style whereby of the 17 far right accounts forwarded by both figurehead and follower accounts, 15 of them were first introduced by the figurehead account. Because of Garrett's far right associations, there was a large volume of content which was forwarded from the far right covering several different themes; although a reoccurring theme for both the figurehead-led and follower-led accounts was the frame of child protection.

8. Great British Bird

The Great British Bird Channel run by Clare Hocking Okell is more focused on covid restrictions, anti-government sentiments, and child abuse. In comparison, the chat version which was follower-led, has forwarded a wider variety of far-right accounts on a broader range of issues including immigration, the Ukraine conflict, free mason conspiracy theories, great replacement conspiracy theories, veterans' rights, big pharma conspiracy theories and protests and offline events.

The follower-led account had forwarded twelve more accounts than the figurehead-led account and of the three accounts forwarded by both the follower and the figurehead, the follower-led account was first to forward two.

	Figurehead Accounts	Follower Accounts
Total	17	20
Unique	0	3
First	15	2

Table 7. Forwarding Summary Lee Garrett

	Figurehead Accounts	Follower Accounts
Total	3	12
Unique	0	9
First	1	2

Table 8. orwarding Summary GreatBritishBird

SUMMARY FIGUREHEAD CASE STUDY

The figurehead case study followed a different method than the previous case studies as it was not dealing with a new dataset. Previous case studies have outlined the symbolic importance of certain central figureheads in promoting interactions between conspiracy and far right groups. The figurehead case study aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the figureheads and the roles they play in the group structure and dynamic. The findings suggest that far right groups tend to be organised in a hierarchy, while conspiracy groups show more open, grassroots discussion. An example of this is the tendency for the far right accounts in our dataset to use channels (as opposed to groups), which on Telegram involves typically one user posting content that their followers can read (with limited ability to interact). In comparison, conspiracy accounts are more likely to be groups where any number of users can join and discuss theories.

In the far-right dataset, figureheads were more likely to introduce and foster interactions with conspiracy groups rather than followers. Whereas in conspiracy groups, followers tended to introduce far-right content or accounts and then if these proved popular, figureheads might further promote them.

These different group dynamics are vulnerable to different threats and forms of manipulation, including hostile state actors. Groups that take a grassroots approach to organisation might be vulnerable to the introduction of new theories via bot networks and manipulation of interactions to inflate the number of people seemingly supporting content. In comparison, groups which were more top-down might imply that manipulation of figurehead could provide a means to manipulate their follower bases. Deeper understanding of how group dynamics impact the behaviour of conspiracy and far right groups could facilitate better prevention of the manipulation of these groups. These points may also provide critical junctures for corrective information and disruption of harmful behaviour. For example, if attempts are made to disrupt harmful behaviour in far-right groups they should carefully consider the ramifications of discrediting a figurehead. Figureheads are especially influential in our the far right dataset; therefore, groups may rally around their figurehead if they feel they are being attacked but by successfully discrediting the figureheads they may disrupt the movement.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The findings of this report can be summarised over three points. First, the interaction case study in this report implemented the SHIFT analysis techniques to cover a new context and larger number of groups demonstrating the adaptability and robustness of this method. Secondly, this analysis has identified discussion and language being organised around key themes which suggests a link between the way users communicate online and offline coordination and events. Unpicking this data several key themes were noted to facilitate interaction and intra-action. This demonstrated that while some frames remain salient, others fluctuate in different contexts. The frames identified are:

1. **Hidden truth** – This theme was referenced in our findings on the QAnon movement (see: *Introducing SHIFT Analysis and Understanding Intra-actions within QAnon: Co-presence of Conspiracy Beliefs and Extremism*) and in the interaction case study reported here, which looked at far right and conspiracy groups predominantly based in the UK. As noted in previous research (ibid) this frame is akin to the epistemic motivations for conspiracy beliefs and served as an isolator, motivating individuals to cut themselves off from the mainstream understanding. This function explains why it was influential in prompting intra-actions in QAnon and in the groups in the interaction case study, however it did not promote interaction between conspiracy and far right groups.

2. **Freedom** – This frame posited that freedoms and rights were being eroded and similarly to the impending doom frame correlated the existential motivation for conspiracy beliefs. This frame was particularly potent in the context of coronavirus restrictions. The existential threat posed as a pre-requisite of this frame, as with the impending doom frame motivated a radical response to regain control.

3. **Child protection** – This perceived the world through the harm it could inflict on children predominantly either through abuse or "untested" vaccines. This frame provided a united sense of purpose across disparate conspiracy and far right groups to animate individuals over a cause they could all agree on, the protection of children. It became increasingly influential during the coronavirus pandemic. It fulfils a social motivation of conspiracy beliefs by focusing on the family unit and identifying in-groups of protectors and out-groups who pose a threat to children. As with the unfair treatment frame, which also posed a social motivation, it creates a bridge between different conspiracy and far right communities by uniting them against a common enemy, those who would do harm to children.

Our final contribution was to show the group dynamics that foster interaction and influence between conspiracy and far right groups. This analysis demonstrated that broadly speaking, far right groups tended to foster interaction with conspiracy groups and content if their figureheads promoted it first, whilst conspiracy groups tended to introduce far right content through discussion between followers. Evidence showed that predominantly far right groups are directly influencing conspiratorial communities rather than the other way round, based on the number of messages forwarded (ratio of 150:1). However, this does not mean that far right groups do not discuss conspiracy content, but they are less directly influenced by the content from conspiracy communities. Further research is needed to unpick why this asymmetrical relationship is skewed so heavily. This report suggests that this may be a result of the impact of more hierarchal structure in our the far right dataset. Therefore, conspiracy groups may

have a greater need to directly repost far right content rather than far right groups, which may wish to add their own interpretation to information and content from conspiracy groups.

FUTURE RESEARCH

In addition to directing future research toward deepening the understanding of why far right content is more likely to be directly reposted into conspiracy groups, these findings highlight the need for further scrutiny in several areas. Following the easing of coronavirus restrictions and the decline of its presence in the headlines, conspiracy and far right communities had to adapt to the changing landscape. As the previous case studies show, narratives in conspiracy and far right communities are continuously evolving and continuous research is needed to understand how narratives have changed in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. It would be reasonable to expect that once covid restrictions eased the aggressive backlash they faced would also decline in unison.

However, our evidence shows that the majority of activity occurred not in response to covid restrictions but in response to vaccines. Indeed, several large-scale protests have occurred after the easing of covid restrictions and vaccine regulation schemes (Covileaks.co.uk, 2023). However, more recent protests have a marked difference in tone, switching from 'us' and 'them' narratives to marching in remembrance of the 'vaccine bereaved' (ibid). Further research is needed to understand the transformation of the narratives in this movement in the current day and how this impacts the security risk they pose. Another point of interest for further investigation includes how the focus of these movements' changes over time. Other research has also highlighted a link between conspiracy and far right groups shifting their concern to Ukraine and Russia (Terracciano, 2023, Henderson, 2022, Mulhall 2022).

Just as narratives can change over time, so to can group dynamics and these changes should be monitored for their impact. Thus, a further area that merits further scrutiny highlighted by this analysis was into the vulnerabilities for manipulation afforded by the different types of group structure. The group dynamics noted in this project are by no means immutable and the internal politics of these groups is constantly shifting. Significant changes such as the loss of status of a figurehead can have dramatic consequences for group behaviour. Therefore, it is important to understand how changes to the figurehead and group dynamics may increase or lessen the security risks posed by these groups. Furthermore, investigation is needed into whether groups are already facing some of the manipulations vulnerable to their specific group dynamic and to create a better understanding of how groups might best be inoculated from outside nefarious interference.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1. Classification of Far-Right Entities from Media, NGOs and Government

Name	Source	Link
Active Patriot	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Alexander Sangmoore	Hope note Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/state-of-hate-2021-final-2.pdf*
Anne Marie Waters News	Hope note Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Britain First	Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism	*https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/E02710035-HCP-Extreme-Right-Wing-Terrorism_Accessible.pdf*
Britain First Chat	Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism	*https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/E02710035-HCP-Extreme-Right-Wing-Terrorism_Accessible.pdf*
British Freedom Party	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Danny Roscoe	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Danny Tommo	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Future For Britain Movement – self-proclaimed Youth wing of For Britain Movement	Politico	*https://www.politico.eu/article/former-ukip-leadership-candidate-to-launch-new-far-right-party/*
Hearts of Oak	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Highland Division	The Herald	*https://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/23505742.uk-far-right-extremists-shattered-scottish-rebellion/*
Jack Dawkins	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Jayda Fransen	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Jayda Fransen Supporters	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Laura Towler	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
London For Britain – self-proclaimed London wing of For Britain Movement	Politico	*https://www.politico.eu/article/former-ukip-leadership-candidate-to-launch-new-far-right-party/*
Luke Uncaged - one of the aforementioned independent journalists continually recognised by The Reality Report channel.	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Mark Collett	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*

New British Union	Guardian	*https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/nov/20/kent-tory-councillor-pictured-in-blackshirt-at-far-right-event*
Nick Griffin	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Official Proud Boys Britannia	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Patriotic Alternative	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Proud Boys Scotland	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Proud Boys Wales	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Sam Yorkshire - a.k.a Sam Meilia	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Street Soldier UK	Part of reality report group	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
The Reality Report	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Tommy Robinson News	Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism	*https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/E02710035-HCP-Extreme-Right-Wing-Terrorism_Accessible.pdf*
Tommy Robinson/Britain First/For Britain	Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism	*https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/E02710035-HCP-Extreme-Right-Wing-Terrorism_Accessible.pdf*
Tommy Robinson's Official Telegram Chat	Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism	*https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/E02710035-HCP-Extreme-Right-Wing-Terrorism_Accessible.pdf*
Vinnie Sullivan	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
Voice of Wales	Hope not Hate	*https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/state-of-hate-2022-v1_17-March-update.pdf*
White Pride Worldwide	Prevent	*https://www.hampshirepreventboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTP-SE-Right-Wing-Factsheet-November-2017.pdf*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BBC. Dover migrant centre attack driven by right-wing ideology - police (2022) BBC News. BBC. Available at: *https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-63526659* (Accessed: November 15, 2022).

BBC. Coronavirus: Twitter bans incitement to attack 5G towers (2020). BBC. Available at: *https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-52395158* (Accessed: March 10, 2023).

Committee on the Judiciary et al. (2019) [bill], To authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to analyse and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism. 116th. 1st Session. (S. 894).

CoviLeaks (2023) Truth be told awareness month, CoviLeaks. Available at: *https://covileaks.co.uk/awareness-month* (Accessed: February 17, 2023).

Dargahi Nobari, A., Reshadatmand, N., & Neshati, M. (2017). *Analysis of Telegram, an instant messaging service.* In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (pp. 2035-2038).

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard University Press.

Henderson, A. (2022). Republican QAnon supporter praises Putin's decisions. Salon. *https://www.salon.com/2022/03/05/qanon-supporter-praises-putins-decisions_partner/* Accessed on May 9, 2022

James, N. (2022). Countering far-right threat through Britishness: The Prevent duty in further education. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 15(1), 121-142.

Lee, B., (2017). Understanding The Far-Right Landscape. Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) Lancaster University, UK

Lee, B., (2019). Overview of the Far-Right. Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) Lancaster University, UK

Montali, S. (2022) "Hoaxed: a podcast investigation of Hampstead's satanic paedophile ring – which doesn't exist," Guardian, 22 September.

Mulhall, J. (2022) Tommy Robinson: Putin's useful idiot?, HOPE not hate. Available at: *https://hopenothate.org.uk/2022/03/17/tommy-robinson-putins-useful-idiot/* (Accessed: 15 April 2023).

Pigden, C. (2006). "Complots of Mischief." In D. Coady (ed.), *Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate*, pp. 139–66. Aldershot: Ashgate

Porter, A. J., & Hellsten, I. (2014). Investigating participatory dynamics through social media using a multideterminant "frame" approach: The case of Climategate on YouTube. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 19(4), 1024-1041.

Ravndal, J. A., & Bjørgo, T. (2018). Investigating terrorism from the extreme right: A review of past and present research. *Perspectives on Terrorism,* 12(6), 5-22.

Searchlight. (2023) Patriotic alternative conference exposes weaknesses and international connections, Searchlight. Available at: *https://www.searchlightmagazine.com/2023/10/patriotic-alternative-conference-exposes-weaknesses-and-international-connections/* (Accessed: 30 May 2024).

Terracciano, B. (2023). Accessing to a "Truer Truth": Conspiracy and Figurative Reasoning From Covid-19 to the Russia–Ukraine War. *Media and Communication*, 11(2), 64-75.

Törnberg, P., & Törnberg, A. (2022). Inside a White Power echo chamber: Why fringe digital spaces are polarizing politics. *New Media & Society*, 14614448221122915.

For more information on CREST
and other CREST resources, visit
www.crestresearch.ac.uk

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND
EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

24-017-01