



Behavioural-Focused Protective Security Programmes

FULL REPORT
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This report is one of a series exploring *Knowledge Management Across the Four Counter-Terrorism 'Ps'*. The project looks at areas of policy and practice that fall within the four pillars of CONTEST. For more information visit:

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KEY POINTS

The evidence base for behavioural-focused protective security programmes is extremely shallow. The vast majority of research is descriptive with little evaluation of the effectiveness of existing campaigns or ‘what works’ in encouraging ordinary citizens to be vigilant against, and report, potential terrorism-related activities in public spaces. However, there is more evidence on barriers and motivations for reporting:

- Research on the motivations and barriers for public reporting of suspicious behaviours linked to terrorism – broadly defined as anything that appears out of place, or unusual so that it could reasonably be considered indicative of pre-operational attack planning – is limited. The most common barriers to reporting are the fear of retribution and concerns over getting an innocent person into trouble.
- Reporting barriers vary by gender and age. Younger and female reporters are more strongly dissuaded by fear of retaliation than older males.
- Clearly explaining that reports will be taken seriously increases the effectiveness of public messaging campaigns which aim to encourage people to report terrorism-related suspicions that indicate hostile intent, for example relating to reconnaissance or attack planning.
- Airport passengers report feeling safer when they are aware of the opportunities to report suspicious behaviour and know who to contact if they see a suspicious item or have concerns about a fellow passenger.
- Younger airport users are as likely to notice suspicious activities at the airport as older passengers, but less likely to report these concerns to airport staff.
- Retail outlets located within or near mass transportation hubs have a role to play in maintaining security because members of the public view them as a means of reporting potential threats. Staff should be trained to respond appropriately

to ensure that information reaches transport and security officials.

- Even pre-school age children can be taught to identify and report unsafe packages based on their physical characteristics and location and can retain this capacity for weeks after training.
- Terrorist decision-making when carrying out or preparing attacks is poorly understood, as is the effectiveness of deterrence by denial, an approach that seeks to demonstrate the low likelihood that an attack will succeed.

The emphasis in this report is on academic literature from 2017 onwards, however due to the extremely limited research in this area, it draws from work published outside this period and grey literature. It also includes work from comparable fields, including studies relating to general criminality. To supplement the limited research, four studies are the subject of more detailed analysis.

The report is in two parts; the first focuses on public reporting and bystanders’ motivations or barriers for doing so. Part two examines how hostile actors perceive and experience security measures. It is important to understand protective security from both perspectives to understand its effectiveness.

INTRODUCTION

*As crowded and public locations have become principal targets for terrorists, public vigilance and reporting have assumed a critical role in public protection*¹

Crowded places continue to be significant targets for terrorists. Worldwide, terrorist attacks have shifted away from disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure assets toward sites where large numbers of people transit or congregate in an effort to maximise potential casualties.

Due to the high footfall and accessibility of locations such as transport hubs, retail centres or entertainment venues, the use of individual screening methods, such as those used in airports, is typically considered impractical. The diverse range of possible targets, and the increasing use of low-tech attack methods means it is difficult for security and law enforcement personnel alone to monitor and detect developing threats.

Public vigilance is seen to play an increasingly important role in protecting crowded places from terrorist attacks. Authorities routinely encourage civilians to monitor their surroundings for things out of place or out of the ordinary. Public announcements stress the need to report suspicious behaviour, such as hostile reconnaissance of potential targets and unattended items. The aim is to deter or detect potential attackers in order to prevent or mitigate harm.

Several high-profile campaigns have been implemented across the world. 'See it. Say it. Sorted', for example, has been used in France, the USA, Denmark, the UK and Japan. However, there has been little evaluation of the effectiveness of these strategic communication campaigns and understanding about what motivates people to report suspicious behaviours is weak. Campaigns to encourage vigilance also face considerable challenges. Communicating the severity of the threat whilst not unnecessarily increasing public

fear or overwhelming authorities with spurious reports can be a difficult balance to strike. There is also the risk that sharing too much information might inform attack planning.

¹ The shifting focus of terror attacks is noted in a number of studies (McIlhatton et al. 2018; Parker et al. 2017). Many countries now use public messaging campaigns to encourage members of the public to notice and report things they perceive as out of the ordinary (Larsson, 2016; Arfsten, 2019). The challenges for developing effective strategic communications in this area have not been explored in great detail (Glazzard & Reed, 2020).

MOTIVATIONS AND BARRIERS TO PUBLIC REPORTING ²

There is little analytical research on the motivations and barriers to public reporting of terrorism-related concerns in public spaces. The most comprehensive study was carried out by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2012 to examine public awareness and reporting of suspicious activities. Data collection consisted of two phases; focus groups of 6–8 participants and telephone surveys with 813 respondents.

A key finding from the FEMA study was the significant difference between official and public understandings of what constitutes suspicious activity. Overall, participants equated suspicious activity to something out of the ordinary or out of place considering the location. This included unknown people or cars lingering near their workplaces or homes, particularly late at night. Over a third (36%) of respondents described traditional criminal activity (10% general crime; 9% burglaries or break-ins; and 7% robberies or muggings).

Only five per cent of survey respondents described activities that could relate to terrorism. The detail of what constitutes suspicious behaviour is often not communicated in public information campaigns. Public messaging is usually highly specific, however definitive lists of potentially suspicious behaviours may be avoided because of the risk of suggesting these are the only ones to look out for.

A number of definitions and examples of suspicious behaviours are used in the literature, although these also often overlap with potential criminal behaviours and include:

- Anything that seems out of place or unusual.
- Observed behaviour that could reasonably be considered indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.
- Someone appearing nervous and clutching a rucksack on public transport.

KEY POINTS

Research analysing the motivations and barriers to public reporting of terrorism-related suspicions is limited. However, a number of findings are identified within the existing literature:

- Suspicious behaviours related to terrorism encompass a broad range of activities and are often not clearly defined. The public commonly understand them in the context of ordinary crime.
- Contextual factors, such as location and time of day, play an important role in determining whether something is out of the ordinary.
- The potential for harm and a belief that information could be useful to police have the greatest influence on whether members of the public would report someone behaving suspiciously.
- There may be differences in respect of reporting informed by gender or age, though existing research is not yet robust enough to determine the strength of this association.

² The lack of research is noted in a number of studies (*Gallagher, 2010; Pearce et al., 2019; FEMA, 2012*). Terrorism-related reporting has been shown to increase in the immediate aftermath of high-profile attacks and when individuals perceive a behaviour has the potential to endanger multiple others (*LaFree and Adamczyk, 2019; Scalora and Bulling, 2019*). There are often considerable difficulties in communicating to the public what suspicious activities look like (Parker et al., 2019).

- The fraudulent purchase of mobile phone SIM cards.
- Individuals performing collective training in remote or discreet locations.

Focus group participants that took part in the FEMA study, explained that their motivation to report was based on 'gut instinct'. Context played an important role, and reporting was heavily influenced by the time and place where the potentially suspicious activity was taking place; for example, an unattended backpack would not be considered suspicious if it was in an area where children often played. A majority of survey respondents reported that the potential for harm (77%) and a belief that police would find the information useful (74%) were the most significant factors in deciding whether to report.

The most frequently cited barrier to reporting in focus groups was fear of retaliation from the subjects of the report or others within their neighbourhood. This finding, however, may be influenced by the fact that many questions were in the context of community reporting. Fear of retaliation is likely to be a less significant barrier in anonymous reporting in public spaces.

Respondents were also worried about being wrong or appearing 'foolish' in the eyes of law enforcement because they were unsure what qualified as 'important enough' to report. Telephone survey participants were given a list of circumstances that could prevent them from reporting suspicious activity. Although a majority of participants said they would not be deterred from reporting, concern about accusing an innocent person (43%), fear of retaliation (36%), and uncertainty that following up their report would be an appropriate use of police resources (31%) all had a negative impact on participants' willingness to report.

Age and gender also influenced reporting, and the barriers to doing so. Compared to men, women were significantly more likely to reconsider or not report suspicious activity due to fear of retaliation, and to be unsure whether reporting was a worthwhile use of police resources. Men were more likely to reassess whether to report suspicious activity if they believed the police may not take the call seriously or had a fear or mistrust of law enforcement.

Barriers to Reporting Suspected Terrorism-Related Activities in Public Spaces Identified in FEMA (2012)




Figure 1: Barriers to reporting suspected terrorism-related activities in public spaces identified in FEMA (2012)

MOTIVATIONS AND BARRIERS TO PUBLIC REPORTING

Behavioural-Focused Protective Security Programmes

Just under half of respondents aged 18–34 said they were more likely to be deterred from reporting suspicious activity due to fear of retaliation. This younger age range were also more likely to believe that police may not take the call seriously (32%) and stated that a fear or mistrust of law enforcement could deter them from reporting suspicious activity (36%). Fear of law enforcement was mentioned less as respondents' age increased.

Older respondents over the age of 65 were less likely than younger participants to be deterred from reporting suspicious activity due to a belief that police may not take the call seriously (19% over 65 years vs. 28% under 34 years). These findings suggest there may be differences in respect of reporting informed by gender or age. However, existing research is not yet robust enough to determine the strength of this association. Public information campaigns should be tested with different demographics to determine if they produce differential responses across age and gender.

THE BYSTANDER EFFECT

*People often don't intervene or report crimes because they think others will. Whilst anonymity does not appear to mitigate this effect, there are cues that can increase people's willingness to step in*³

The bystander effect suggests people are more likely to help others when they are alone than when other bystanders are present. People feel less personal responsibility to help because they attribute a substantial part of the responsibility to others. Whilst there is little research on bystander effects on the reporting of terrorism-related behaviours, situational factors shown to influence the likelihood of bystander intervention and reporting in public places for general crime include:

- Level of ambiguity over the observed event
- Seriousness of the crime or other emergency situation
- Perceived level of danger to the individual as a result of their intervention
- Number of other bystanders present

- Location of the observed event.

Fear of retribution is an important reason people give for being reluctant to report suspected terrorist-related activities. However, ensuring anonymity seems to have little effect on decisions to report three types of criminal behaviour including theft, physical assault, and sexual assault. The bystander effect can be mitigated by using cues that raise an individual's public self-awareness or their perceptions that others might view them negatively for failing to act. For example, increasing the visibility of security cameras can make people more likely to report crime-related behaviours due to the fear of repercussions if they are seen not responding. However, other cues, such as signs, have not been shown to have the same effect.

To date, research has largely focused on descriptive analyses of reporting patterns. Consequently, there is limited evidence about how to increase the effectiveness of communications campaigns designed to encourage the public to contact the police with terrorism-related suspicions. Experimental studies that manipulate specific factors would make it possible to test the impact of public messaging on reporting and help to evaluate specific security programmes in different contexts, such as rail travel, airports, or crowded spaces. This report now turns to consider some of the relevant existing research in depth.

³ The limited impact that anonymity has on rates of bystander reporting was found in Nicksa's study of different forms of non-terrorism related crimes (2014), whilst the positive role that cues can play in mitigating the bystander effect is described by van Bommel et al. (2012).

1. INTERPRETING WHAT INFLUENCES PUBLIC REPORTING FOLLOWING A TERRORIST ATTACK

KEY POINTS:

- None of the 61 reports made to police in the two months following the Glasgow airport attack made reference to government campaigns or information as a motivating factor.
- Significantly more men, and older people, made reports than younger people and women.
- Media coverage was the most commonly reported motivation for reporting.
- Beyond reporting of more general forms of suspicious behaviour, reports about hostile reconnaissance were most common.

Terrorism-related reporting tends to increase in the immediate aftermath of high-profile attacks and when people see behaviour that appears to pose a danger to multiple people. Following the June 2007 Glasgow Airport attack and the associated attempted attacks in London, Lothian and Borders Police believed that public reporting of terrorism-related matters might increase.


Although no measures to improve reporting were put in place, between July and August 2007 'Operation Mainsail' saw a team of detectives monitor and evaluate tip-offs. Analysis of 88 statements about 61 incidents found significant differences in reporters'

characteristics and in the types of behaviours they reported:

- Significantly more men (62%) than women (38%) reported concerns. No explanation for this difference was identified.
- More people in the 41–50 age bracket made reports (24), compared with those aged 21–30 (18) and 31–40 (15). Reporting by the under-20s was extremely low (2).
- A wide range of ages made reports. The youngest was 12 and the oldest was 74. The average age of male and female reporters was similar: 40.84 and 44.13 years respectively.
- Those from unskilled professions made up the largest share of reporters (31%), followed by professionals (17%). Only a small number were unemployed (7%).

Coding of the 61 incidents identified eight categories of reported behaviour. The most common was suspicious activity, however this category includes all events that did not fall under the other codes. Following this, hostile reconnaissance was the most common type of behaviour people reported.

This research is based on Gallagher (2010).



2. PASSENGER AWARENESS OF EMERGENCY PROCEDURES IN AIRPORTS

KEY POINTS:

- Airport passengers of different ages are as likely to notice suspicious activities at the airport. However, younger passengers appear less likely to report their concerns.
- Passengers report feeling safer in airports when they understand how to report suspicious behaviour and know whom to contact if they identify something suspicious.

As part of a study exploring airport users' awareness of wayfinding tools and emergency procedures, passengers were also asked about their perceptions of threats and safety. A survey of 950 people was undertaken at an Australian (Melbourne) and Chinese (Qingdao) airport. Amongst other measures, the questionnaire sought to capture passengers' awareness of suspicious items or behaviours and how to report them.

Participants' responses to statements were measured using a five-point scale, ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to 5 'strongly agree'. Several questions directly addressed passengers' awareness of suspicious items or behaviours and how to report them:

- If I find suspicious items, I will report to the airport staff.
- If I see suspicious behaviour of passengers, I will report to the airport staff.
- I know whom to contact if I see suspicious items or behaviours in the airport.
- The final statement 'I feel safe in the airport' was included to understand passengers' overall perceptions of their safety.

Passengers at both airports reported feeling safe, although more so at Melbourne than Qingdao. Across both samples, passengers' perception of safety was positively related to their ability to report suspicious behaviour and knowing whom to contact if they encountered something concerning. Although

the study did not test why this might be the case, it could be attributed to airport announcements urging passengers to report anything suspicious, including the 'If You See Something, Say Something' campaign in Australia.

Significant age differences were found in the Australian sample. Across nearly all security-focused measures, younger passengers recorded higher scores, indicating a stronger perceived awareness of security-relevant issues. Only two areas saw higher scores from older passengers, relating to willingness to report suspicious behaviour or unattended items. Whilst younger passengers are as likely to notice suspicious activities, they seem less likely to report these concerns to airport staff.

This research is based on *Shiwakoti et al. (2019)*.

3. WHAT ENCOURAGES PUBLIC REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR ON RAIL NETWORKS?

KEY POINTS:

- Providing information that reports will be taken seriously increases the effectiveness of public messaging campaigns.
- Private retail outlets and their staff in transport hubs have a role to play in maintaining security because members of the public see them as a means of reporting their concerns.
- Public and official definitions of what constitutes suspicious behaviour may differ. The inclusion of specific behaviours in public vigilance campaigns may increase reporting intention.

Public transport is a significant target for terrorist attacks. To understand what influences people's intention to report suspicious behaviour on rail networks, an experimental survey was carried out in the UK and Denmark, including an assessment of the 'See it. Say it. Sorted' campaign.

To understand people's baseline willingness to report threats, participants were initially asked whether they

would report suspicious behaviour or unattended items. Around 70 per cent of participants in both countries said they would report an unattended item, although they were less likely to report suspicious behaviour. Participants were then presented with a two-stage hypothetical scenario:

- **Stage 1:** Participants were asked to imagine that they were sitting outside a cafe in the concourse of a train station when they see a young man who appears to be filming one of the station's CCTV cameras on his phone.
- **Stage 2:** Participants were informed that some time had passed since they first saw the young man who appeared to be filming multiple cameras and were told 'you are now certain that he is recording the location of all CCTV cameras in the train station'.

At each stage participants were asked to score the likelihood that they would take the following actions from 'not at all likely' to 'very likely':

To report the incident	<p><i>Tell a member of rail staff or police officer</i></p> <p><i>Call the police</i></p> <p><i>Tell a member of staff at the café</i></p>
Actions that do not involve reporting	<p><i>Ask the person filming what they are doing</i></p> <p><i>Ask other customers if they think the behaviour looks suspicious</i></p> <p><i>Leave the station</i></p>
Inaction	<p><i>Wait and see</i></p> <p><i>Do nothing</i></p>

3. WHAT ENCOURAGES PUBLIC REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR ON RAIL NETWORKS?

Behavioural-Focused Protective Security Programmes

LEVELS OF CERTAINTY

Levels of certainty around what participants feel is suspicious shapes responses. By manipulating the degree of certainty about a possible threat, the study found that lower uncertainty increased the likelihood people would report, particularly to the police. Even so, less than a quarter of respondents said they would tell someone, preferring to wait for further evidence before reporting.

PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS

Perceived effectiveness of reporting suspicious behaviour influences people's intentions. To explore what shapes this process, one group of participants were presented with the 'See it. Say it' guidance that emphasised the importance of vigilance and the public's role in security. A second group of participants had the same information but were also told their reports would be taken seriously and carefully checked by the police, as well as seeing evidence that public reporting had led to a successful arrest in the past. This reflected the focus of the 'See it. Say it. Sorted' campaign that seeks to highlight the potential impact of reporting.

Providing the additional 'Sorted' advice had a positive impact on UK participants' intention to report their concerns to police, rail, and station cafe staff where the threat was uncertain. It also significantly increased their intention to tell a member of staff at the cafe and to call the police when they were more confident about the threat. However, over 90 per cent of UK respondents indicated that they would report the behaviour to a member of rail staff at this point, so the impact of this additional information is unclear. Danish participants exposed to the 'Sorted' guidance reported a greater intention to call the police when uncertainty about the threat level was both high and low.

ALL STAFF

All staff working in transport hubs have a role to play in security. Most participants were likely to report concerns to police, rail, or station café staff. This highlights the role of private retail outlets and their staff in security and makes comprehensive training important.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Contextual factors may influence reporting intentions. Higher levels of intention to report in the UK compared with Denmark may be due to the UK's longer history of terrorist attacks on transport networks. More research is needed to understand whether a greater perception of threat, and longer exposure to communication campaigns encouraging public vigilance, help explain this difference.

BARRIERS

Barriers to reporting include fears that reports might be disregarded or waste police time. Public reporting can be increased by providing information emphasising that reports will be taken seriously. This strengthens the evidence for the UK's approach that stresses that police will take a proactive response to reports and highlights the role of public vigilance in successful prosecutions.

SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR

Suspicious behaviour is less commonly reported than unattended items, in part due to the difficulty determining what constitutes behaviour worth reporting. This strengthens the evidence that there are different official and lay understandings of suspicious behaviour. There can also be a reluctance to report behaviour that does not appear to be clearly relevant to attack planning. Increasing public awareness about what suspicious behaviour looks like may help mitigate people's reluctance to report.

This research is based on Pearce et al. (2019). Other research to look at the difficulties in communicating what suspicious activities look like to the public include Parker et al., 2019. The finding that people are less likely to report unless the behaviour appears to relate to attack planning is discussed in Lafree and Adamczyk, 2017.

4. UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S ABILITY TO DETECT SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES

KEY POINTS:

- Children aged 4–5 can be taught to identify unsafe packages based on both their physical characteristics and location.
- Children are able to learn procedures to protect themselves and to report unsafe packages.
- Children retain both of these capacities for a number of weeks after they receive this training.

In some settings, such as schools, suspicious packages are likely to be discovered by children. Although there are important ethical issues associated with engaging with children on counter-terrorism issues, it can be helpful to understand whether children are able to identify and report suspicious items.

Over a series of experiments, the study worked with a small number of children in the USA to identify and report unsafe packages. Suspicious items were characterised by protruding wires, powdery substances, oily discharge, excessive tape or ticking sounds. The children were shown a series of potentially dangerous packages and also took part in scenarios where dummy packages were placed in areas of the school designated 'safe' (classroom or locker) or 'unsafe' (hallways and toilets).

- Without training the children correctly identified the unsafe packages by their appearance a little under a third of the time. After they had received training, including an explanation about why a package was unsafe, they correctly identified all packages as safe or unsafe across multiple sessions. All three children in the first experiment maintained 100 per cent accuracy at follow-up sessions undertaken three, six, and nine weeks after the training session.
- Training enabled the four children involved in the second experiment to identify packages as safe and unsafe depending on their locations with complete

accuracy up to six weeks after the training. This compared with 39 per cent accuracy before training.

- Before receiving training on what to do if they found a package, two out of the three children in the final experiment touched the package during one of the trials and only one left the area in one trial. Once they had been trained to avoid touching packages they found on school property; to leave the area and inform an adult, all three participants carried out these instructions every time across multiple sessions.

This study suggests that even young children can be taught to identify safe and unsafe packages based on their physical characteristics and location and that this ability persists weeks after receiving training. Questions of ethics and child welfare are paramount, however, these findings suggest that training programmes with children might be able to play a role in helping to improve school safety providing they are done sensitively.

This research is based on *May et al. (2018)*.

DETECTING TERRORIST ATTACKERS

*The factors that influence terrorist attackers' decision-making and what might deter them are poorly understood. Security measures and strategic communications that increase attackers' fears might help protect public sites but have yet to be tested*⁴

The literature on criminal decision-making has found that risk perception, or how individuals calculate the chances of apprehension and the consequences of being caught, are central factors in understanding and deterring criminality. The certainty of detection is more influential in discouraging would-be offenders than the severity of punishment. Terrorist decision-making seems to mirror this process.

'Deterrence by denial' aims to dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them that their efforts will not succeed. Deterrence may be absolute, so that an individual entirely abandons engaging in an attack because of the perceived risks; or restrictive, where an attack goes ahead, but the perpetrator makes deliberate choices to change how they carry it out in order to minimise risk.

Would-be attackers respond dynamically to the security measures they encounter or suspect they will face, such as CCTV cameras, patrols by security staff and law enforcement, and potential detection by conscientious bystanders. However, unlike most criminal offenders, highly motivated terrorist attackers may accept a high probability of failure. Certain terrorist groups may benefit even if an attack fails: foiled attempts attract publicity, cause fear within target audiences, and demonstrate groups are active. However, some attackers are wary of the reputational damage that a failed or foiled attack might pose to their group and cause. Further evidence is needed to establish where, when, and to what extent deterrence is effective in the context of terrorism.

Analysis of terrorist-authored autobiographies highlights that attackers seek out information on the state and effectiveness of security and often keep several targets in mind in case of unexpected developments. Terrorists commonly report that fear and nerves negatively impact their decision-making when planning and undertaking attacks. These emotions, and awareness of security procedures can lead terrorists to believe they are subject to more extensive monitoring than is the case. This may lead them to make a conscious effort to 'act normally', which may appear suspicious in itself.

Policies that highlight and evidence the ability of law enforcement, security, staff, and bystanders to detect suspicious behaviours may provide a means of disrupting terrorist operations. Crime reduction campaigns also often communicate with perpetrators directly. For example, Neighbourhood Watch groups visibly advertise their presence, even where their capacity might not match these projections.

So far, the use of strategic communication techniques to deter would-be attackers appears to have been largely overlooked in counterterrorism efforts. More research is needed to understand what influences their effectiveness, including how hostile actors perceive and respond to public communication initiatives.

⁴ The factors which affect offender decision-making are well established within criminology (Pratt et al. 2006; Apel & Nagin, 2017; Gill et al. 2019). The potential of using deterrence by denial has been addressed in a number of studies including: Davis, 2014; Gross Stein & Levi, 2020; and Gill et al. 2018. For research that has considered terrorist decision-making, see: Davis, 2014; Gill et al. 2018; and Gill et al. 2019. Strategic communications that directly address would-be terrorist attackers remain an unused but potentially effective means of deterrence (Glazzard & Reed, 2020).

ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE BASE

The evidence base around public reporting of suspected terrorism-related threats is extremely shallow. Although there has been some research on the motivations and barriers that impact reporting, these studies need further empirical validation. Public understanding of what constitutes suspicious behaviour or activities that suggest an attack is in preparation are not well developed. Research suggests that public and official understandings of suspicious behaviour diverge. The next step for research is to understand what these differences are, and how the gap between them can be closed.

There is a marked lack of evaluation of messaging campaigns designed to increase public reporting of suspected terrorism-related threats. This is despite

many such programmes being adopted across the world. Research is needed to understand how the context in which campaigns are used impacts their effectiveness. Drawing comparative insights across settings should be approached cautiously as a country's social, political and historical context can influence how people respond.

Whilst there is considerable literature on criminal decision-making, there are far fewer studies relating to terrorists. Further work is needed to understand how would-be attackers' fears of detection or apprehension might be influenced. The use of strategic communications that target potential terrorist attackers directly might be effective in protecting certain sites, however empirical evidence is required to test this assumption.

READ MORE

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The logo graphic consists of three concentric, semi-circular red arcs on the left side, partially overlapping a solid red circle. The word "CREST" is written in white, uppercase, sans-serif font across the middle of the red circle.

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